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ABSTRACT
Benefits have been claimed by adopting virtualization techniques in many
fields. It could significantly reduce the cost of managing systems, including
critical systems used in cyber power grid. However, in such environments,
multiple virtual instances run on the same physical machine concurrently, and
reliance on logical isolation makes a system vulnerable to attacks. Virtual
Machine Introspection techniques show effectiveness in building a more secure
virtualized environment, since they simplify the process to acquire evidence
for further analysis in this complex system.
However, the VMI technique breaks down the borders of the segregation
between multiple tenants, which might lead to the disclosure of cloud tenants’
data. This potential threat becomes a concern for virtual instances running
critical systems, and hence it should be avoided in a public cloud computing
environment. The disclosure of data could happen easily due to compromised
connections, both inside and outside of the cloud, and the misuse of the cloud
administrator’s authorization.
Thus, in this thesis, we focus on building a secure framework, CryptVMI,
to address the above concerns. Our approach maintains a client application
on the user end to send queries to the cloud, as well as parse the results re-
turned in a standard form. We also have a handler that cooperates with the
introspection applications in the cloud infrastructure to process queries and
return encrypted results. The introspection application is able to extract in-
formation reflecting the behaviors of the guest systems. It also demonstrates
its ability to restore processes upon unexpected modification from the remote
user.
This work shows our design and implementation of this system, and the
benchmark results prove that it does not incur much performance overhead.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Situation Awareness
The cloud computing becomes popular its power, as the size of data be-
ing stored and processed in industry is increasing drastically. Building and
maintaining storage as well as computation infrastructures become trivial in
a cloud environment. Some companies build their own private cloud services,
and other companies including Netflix [1] and Dropbox [2], tend to use pub-
lic cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) [3]. Virtualization
has turned out to be necessary in both private and public cloud comput-
ing solutions, because it provides better utilization of resources and reduces
the cost by allowing multiple instances of operating systems (OS) owned by
multiple tenants to run concurrently on the same physical machine. Bene-
fits have been also shown by adopting virtualization techniques in the cyber
power grid [4], such as migrating Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems into a virtualized environment. Since VMs share the same
hardware resources, the Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) is able to reduce
redundancy for multiple similar SCADA systems. Though multiple OSes are
running in their own virtual machines (VM) and sharing the same physical
infrastructure, the VMM can still ensure high availability for users [5].
However, sharing the same physical resources brings up security issues.
Even though a VM should only be allowed to access its own resources by de-
sign, the traffic between VMs essentially breaks down the physical isolation.
The logical isolation in cloud environments is built in the software layer and,
consequently, the security guarantees are weaker [6]. A compromised VM can
easily and quickly spread malware and make the entire system vulnerable to
more attacks. Moreover, it takes time for cloud service users to detect those
compromises.
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While traditional security systems, such as Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS), are able to enforce policies on every node in a network system and
detect violations in real-time, the virtualization framework makes cloud envi-
ronments complex, and hence it is difficult to collect evidence in such systems.
These facts lead to the development of Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI)
techniques. VMI tools inspect a VM from a trustworthy outside environ-
ment. The outside environment usually refers to the host system and it is
protected with techniques, such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) protec-
tion, so users are able to access the entire system and acquire the genuine
information of a VM to describe the state of the guest system [7]. IDSes can
be built with this technique in the cloud for greater attack resistance, while
providing an excellent view of the states in VMs [8].
Though using VMI is a simple and convenient approach for cloud users
to acquire trustworthy information from their running VM instances, the
inflexibility to integrate with existing security monitoring systems and the
possibility of exposing confidential information from VMs makes it difficult
to apply this technique in the cloud. There are many private cloud infras-
tructures that have embedded VMI into their systems to enhance security
[9], but those VMI frameworks are customized to specific environments, mak-
ing it difficult to use them in cooperation with existing security monitoring
systems, such as Bro IDS [10]. Concerns are also raised for public cloud
systems, since the VMI technique might break down the borders of the seg-
regation between multiple tenants [11]. Companies running their services on
public cloud infrastructure would not want to expose their application states
to the cloud service provider. Moreover, even in a private cloud, the misuse
of administrative authorizations might lead to more attacks [12], and hence
any opportunities that could be exploited to examine VM states, even by the
cloud administrators, should be minimized. This is especially important for
a cloud environment running critical systems like SCADA systems for the
power grid. Thus, the necessity is obvious to build a secure framework based
on VMI for critical systems, which is able to detect attacks effectively and
provide self protection functionalities. Such a framework makes the systems
running inside observable and easy to manage. The framework should be
performant, as many critical systems are used in metering large amount of
real-time data [4].
Therefore, we propose CryptVMI, an secure framework built with VMI
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techniques, to provide cloud tenants complete status of their virtual in-
stances, while keeping confidentiality from possible attackers, including ad-
ministrators of cloud services. This system also provides users semistructured
outputs as results, which could be extended to work with its built-in and
other existing security monitoring systems, on the user end to provide better
security for their systems, especially when their cloud computing frameworks
are running in the public cloud. With the semistructured outputs, users are
able to examine the entire states of their VMs from the remote end, even if
it is a mobile device. This framework does not require any modification to
the network interface of applications connected to guest systems. It also pro-
vides an effective strategy to restore processes upon unexpected modification
to the VM.
1.2 Thesis Contribution
We design and implement this secure framework based on Virtual Machine
Introspection system techniques to provide a simple interface with semistruc-
tured data for users to extend this system with other security monitoring
systems. We show that CryptVMI keeps confidentiality of users’ information
from their VMs in the whole encrypted VMI process. We demonstrate that
our encryption scheme introduces minimum overhead to system performance.
Furthermore, our built-in policy examiner on the remote end is able to ef-
fectively monitor violations happened in a guest system based on user defined
policies, and restore modified processes by attacks.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of this work is organized as follows. We first explain our motivation
of proposing such a framework with case studies and summarize related works
in Chapter 2. Next, we show the big picture of our framework along with
its design in Chapter 3 and implementation details in Chapter 4. We then
evaluate it through various experiments and analyze the results in Chapter
5. In Chapter 6, we conclude our work and discuss future approaches.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Case Study on Critical System Security
Compromised critical systems could lead to destructive results. SCADA
systems are one type of most widely used critical systems in the world. If such
systems are modified or turned off in a power plant and grid, power generation
and transmission could be suspended due to attacks, and hence the attacks
might even destroy the physical power infrastructure and become a serious
threat to human life. In this section, we show possible attacks in SCADA
systems with real world cases, and also summarize the significant properties
that a framework should have in order to guarantee SCADA systems running
in a secured environment.
2.1.1 Stuxnet
Stuxnet is the first known worm targeting specific infrastructure like elec-
tricity grids, It is very different from other types of worms. Unlike other
applications running in an Operating System (OS) with anti-malware soft-
ware installed, SCADA systems are monitored by Programmable Logic Con-
trollers (PLC). PLCs control critical systems with strict security limits. It is
difficult to attack a PLC, because it is usually written in a specific language.
However, Stuxnet is able to exploit the vulnerabilities of OSes to target those
that construct the PLCs. It injects malicious code into the PLC and hence
makes it compromised [13]. Thus, it is able to take control of SCADA sys-
tems. The main reason for the successful attack of Stuxnet back in 2010 is
that the softwares for PLCs are not well-defined [13]. Thus, we believe that
any computer framework that runs, monitors, or creates softwares, could be
resilient. The frameworks should be always actively maintained and moni-
4
tored; It should be also simple enough, as it is shown that more lines of codes
of a program would introduce more vulnerabilities.
In addition, Stuxnet could take advantage of the vulnerabilities of OSes. It
takes zero-day vulnerabilities to initiate its attack, and those vulnerabilities
are usually not noticed until the attack. Moreover, the attacker is able to
hide all related malicious processes, which prevents detection of its presence.
Since it is difficult to cover every single corner of an OS to prevent zero-day
attacks, there are some zero-day protection techniques were developed based
on policy conformance frameworks and they demonstrate the effectiveness
in the scope of keeping integrity of a system. Therefore, the monitoring
framework for a critical system should be able to provide warning of zero-
day attacks. This also requires the monitoring framework to be resilient and
trustworthy continuously.
2.1.2 Shamoon
Shamoon is known as the most destructive post-Stuxnet discovery for SCADA
systems, which attacked 30,000 workstations and caused the company to
spend a week to restore their systems [14]. It corrupts files on a compro-
mised computer and overwrites its Master Boot Record (MBR). During its
spreading stage, Shamoon’s wiper component embeds or disguises itself into
system executables.
Thus, we want to detect the infected processes in a critical system in time,
and restore any of them to its secured state if possible. Furthermore, we
would like to keep evidence for infected processes for later investigation.
In summary, the framework for a critical system should be able to provide
genuine data describing an entire view of the critical system. This fact re-
quires the monitoring framework to be trustworthy all the time. It is also
required to restore the system to a clean state upon attacks. Several types of
approaches have been discussed. Some research focuses on enhancing secu-
rity by adding additional security layers into the system, such as creating a
middle layer using security-enhanced Linux between SCADA systems and the
external network [15], but it makes the whole system complicated with the
additional layers and hence incurs a performance overhead. Others manage
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to acquire evidences to detect attacks, such as the digital forensics framework
Forenscope [16], which is effective in obtaining a complete state of the entire
system with trustworthy information, but it needs to reset and restore both
the hardware and software states.
We have sufficient reasons to build a secure framework to run and monitor
critical systems. It should be resilient and simple. The data extracted from
this framework should be trustworthy so as to reveal an accurate represen-
tation of the monitored parameters. Moreover, it should be able to restore
the system to a secure state to neutralize attacks.
2.2 Related Work
Checking the state of a system insides of a cloud environment as a whole
is hard. It requires the security monitoring system to be located on the
host, but this approach makes the security system susceptible to attacks.
Alternatively, if we deploy the monitoring systems in the network, the view
will be limited [8]. Livewire takes advantage of VMI techniques to retain
the full view of a host-based IDS, but pulls the IDS outside of the host,
namely the node in a network, for greater attack resistance [8]. In addition
to visibility, an input framework built on top of Bro IDS was presented for
flexibility and scalability. It provides a simple yet flexible user interface
and support for asynchronous operation, which enables an IDS to analyze
high-volume packet streams under soft real-time constraints [17]. Odessa
also proposed a solution to build a resilient policy compliance system in
the network. It is designed to distribute the evaluation of rules in a scalable
fashion, which employs a set of monitoring agents on the nodes in the network
and validates global rules in their corresponding verifiers [18]. Thus, we want
to collect the evidence from the OS directly, while keeping the security system
in a safe state. Furthermore, the evidence obtained should be standardized
in a simple form for users or other security monitoring systems, like an IDS.
The evidence should be also available for multiple analysis frameworks for
stronger resilience.
Nowadays, many users start using cloud services due to the benefits of
a flexible and elastic infrastructure. Virtualization techniques and bridged
networks are widely used in such environments, which make the system even
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more complicated. It also leads to more security concerns, such as the weak-
ened isolation and possible misuse of administrative permissions. We can
use VMI tools to simplify this complex system, and obtain the entire state
of a VM from the safer outside, namely the Dom0 or host for virtual systems
running on Xen or KVM, respectively. However, many companies pay for
public cloud services to store their data and run computational applications,
because of the ease of configuration and maintenance. Thus, the concern for
confidentiality becomes inevitable. For instance, if Amazon started providing
VMI features for its cloud users, then the administrators in Amazon would be
able to access the entire state of every customer’s VM running in their public
cloud. This is definitely not what Amazon’s customers want to happen with
respect to their privacy. Furthermore, running critical systems in the public
cloud would become an ethical issue due to this possible disclosure of data.
Even in a private cloud, the possible misuse of administrative permissions is
also a serious security problem. Thus, we want to collect data with simple
VMI techniques from VMs through the complex cloud framework, but we
also want to keep the confidentiality of any sensitive information obtained
during this process.
Therefore, a secure framework in the cloud, which is able to respond to
queries from multiple users or security monitoring systems with simple and
standardized results would be beneficial. The concern for credibility of data
gathered is minimized and the data can be as much as the whole picture of
a VM, since VMI work is processed in a trustworthy outside environment.
In addition, the queries to VMs and returned results should be encrypted to
address the concern of the possible leakage of users’ data.
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CHAPTER 3
SYSTEM DESIGN
3.1 Threat Model
In a cloud environment, the compute node should not be easily compromised.
Hence, systems running VMs are trustworthy environments. This guarantees
that the information gathered using VMI is genuine. If the compute node,
which is essentially the host system in a virtualized environment, is compro-
mised, it may result in misleading data. However, this should rarely happen.
The host systems in the cloud should be protected by TPM, and hence the
integrity is usually guaranteed. Nowadays, labeling technique is also widely
used, so that all processes and files in a system are labeled in a way that rep-
resents security information. Labeling also works in our framework. Though
the native support for feature in Linux, like SELinux, is usually disabled for
better VMI integration [19], most hypervisors still provide their own schemes
for labeling, such as Xen Security Modules (XSM) for Xen [20]. Also, since
the host system Dom0 is essentially a VM on Xen hypervisor for management
purposes, the security of a host system mainly depends on the VMM. It is
obvious that VMM could be also seen as an OS, but it is significantly sim-
pler than standard modern OSes, which has been within 30 thousand lines
of code [8]. Moreover, in a mature commercial public cloud service system,
cloud service providers also utilize state-of-the-art electronic surveillance and
multi-factor access control systems with a 24/7 monitoring service [3]. Thus,
a VMM is much more difficult for an attacker to compromise.
We also assume that the VM running in a compute node might be totally
malicious. The impact of a malicious VM is still trivial in this case, since we
can obtain the entire genuine state of the VM and detect the problem in time.
For instance, inside of the malicious VM, a malware might be able to hide
itself from a user’s inspection, such as the ps aux command, but it cannot
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remove itself from the processes list of the OS running in the VM, otherwise
it will not be effective. Even if attackers can exploit a compromised VM and
manage to attack the VMM, VMMs like Xen [21] and KVM [22] are able
to defend against such attacks with their own security mechanisms. In the
worst case, the security of the cloud system will still detect the attack, though
it might result in the loss of their data and suspending of their services for
cloud users.
Users can access their VMs through a secure connection, such as Secure
Shell (SSH), which should be secure enough to avoid most man-in-the-middle
attacks if the SSH keys are not obtained by attackers. However, connecting
to a compromised VM from the remote end might lead to the infection of
users’ machines. We expect that users have anti-malware programs on their
own OSes.
Furthermore, we presume that co-location attacks [23] might happen. Thus,
we do not want to expose the structure of our cloud system to users, such as
on which compute node a VM is located, or the IP address of the node. This
approach should minimize the chances for such attacks, and it also keeps
transparency to users.
Our objective is to prevent potential attackers, including cloud adminis-
trators, from knowing the entire state of a user’s VM. The disclosure could
happen due to the compromised connection between the remote user and the
cloud, or the compromised internal connections inside of the cloud as well as
the misuse of the cloud administrator’s authorization.
In our framework, VMI applications are set up with root authorization.
We assume that the normal administrators of the public cloud system do not
have root authorization on compute nodes, since there would be no need for
the cloud administrators to gain such authorization, once the cloud has been
configured and securely booted with TPM. This assumption is reasonable in
reality for a public cloud, as they are in a group with only limited permissions
interacting with the cloud service application programming interfaces (API)
and VMs, otherwise the administrator can install their own VMI tools, even
bypassing the logs in a cloud system. Therefore, configuration files and keys
stored with root permission for CryptVMI also stay safe. As it is shown in
Table 3.1, the access permissions are categorized for various types of contents.
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Table 3.1: Access Permissions in CryptVMI Framework
Content for Access VMI Framework Admin User
Running at root Yes No No
Cloud Tenant Info No All Only own tenants
VM Location Info Yes Yes No
VMI Keys All No Only own paris
Data in VMs All No Only own VMs
3.2 CryptVMI in the Cloud
In this section, we present concepts that we used to design CryptVMI, as well
as the architecture for this VMI system. First, we show show the architecture
of this system. Second, we discuss how we can guarantee the integrity of the
host system with TPM. Third, we discuss the interface that we used for
users’ queries and results. Forth, we describe our encryption and decryption
scheme. Last, we explain why network transparency for a guest system to
its connect external applications or sensors is necessary.
3.2.1 Architecture
The design of CryptVMI has three major components. Figure 3.1 shows
the overview of this framework. Dotted lines represent secure connections or
connections with encrypted components. There is only one remote user and
one compute node shown, but multiple clients and compute nodes are sup-
ported in our design. The secure connection from the remote cloud tenants
to their owned VMs is not part of the VMI system, but it suggests a general
approach that users communicate with their instances.
The first component is the client application along with the policy examiner
on the remote user end. It accepts queries from users or other security
applications, and directs queries to the handler. It also eventually decrypts
results returned from the cloud. The built-in policy examiner extracts system
information from the client application and monitors the status of guest
systems with user-defined policies. We will explain the methodology that we
used for this examiner in next section. The second component handles queries
sent from the client application. Once the query is processed, the encrypted
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data is transferred back to the client. The third component involves strategies
to acquire desired results with encryption.
Figure 3.1: A High Level View of the CryptVMI Architecture
User Client
Once a query is accepted, the user client application will assign a unique ID
and a random symmetric key s to this query. The command is encrypted
with the key s, and the key is encrypted with the user’s corresponding public
key c. The client then initiates the request to the management node in the
cloud environment through a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) connection, whose
address is loaded from the configuration file.
The client application handles the result in its callback function. Once the
result is received, the application first decrypts it with key s and then decodes
it with Base64, if the query is requesting binary data, such as memory dumps.
Eventually, it sends back the data to the query’s origination.
Query’s origination generally includes the built-in policy examiner de-
ployed on the remote end, however other security monitoring systems are
also able to request data from this client in a RESTful fashion. Since the ap-
plication is written in Ruby and might not be run in root, users can modify
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the code to parse the returned data in different formats, and hence make it
easy to cooperate with various applications, such as IDSes.
Query Handler
The request received from the client has five parts: the unique ID of the
query, the user’s information including the credential token, VM instance
name in the cloud system, symmetric key s encrypted with user’s public key
c and the command encrypted with key s. Once the handler receives this
request, it first checks the user’s token and the instance name with the cloud
service API to verify if there is such a VM associated with this tenant, and if
this user has access to the requested instance in the cloud. The handler then
uses the cloud service API to locate the IP address of the compute node that
holds the designated VM, and obtains this VM’s name to the hypervisor. The
name of a VM to the hypervisor is usually different from its instance name
provided from the cloud service API to the user, and hence this mapping
becomes necessary.
Communications in this process are not encrypted, because they are in the
internal cloud system network, and the cloud administrator should already
know the unencrypted information such as the name of the VM. Since the
command and the key s are encrypted, the details will not be disclosed. In
addition, the command is essentially a JSON document inside of the request,
and hence it is flexible with various parameters. Thus, a new request is sent
to the introspection application on the corresponding compute node.
Finally, the query handler sends the encrypted result data back to the
client.
Introspection Application
The introspection application manages users’ private keys, and hence it de-
crypts the key s with the the specific user’s private key d. Thus, it is able
to decrypt the command message. The introspection application translates
the message and invokes corresponding VMI tools built on top of the VMI
library to acquire desired results.
Results are then encrypted with the symmetric key s and transferred back
to the query handler.
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Though all three components are written in Ruby, the client application
does not have to be run in root, since the users usually take control of their
own machines and there are only the public keys stored at the their end. Each
of these components is described in following subsections. Additionally, there
is a series of VMI tools deployed on compute nodes, which are written in C.
3.2.2 Trusted Platform Module
TPM is enabled on both the compute nodes and management nodes in order
to assure the integrity of the platform. It guarantees a system to start the
boot process from a trusted condition, until the OS has completely booted
and applications are running [24].
TPM also contains several Platform Configuration Registers (PCR), which
enable the secure storage and is able to report security metrics. The metrics
can be used to detect changes in the system. Thus, utilizing TPM is able
to assure platform integrity, which provides us a trustworthy host system for
our VMI operations on guest systems.
3.2.3 Flexible and Simplified Interface
We want our interface for users or other security monitoring systems to
achieve good performance and scalability. Also, the query should be simple
and easy to write, while the result is standardized and flexible. Additionally,
considering that data transmission through the network is a major part of
our system, we want to reduce the network throughput.
RESTful API
Representational State Transfer (REST) is a data style designed for modern
web and distributed applications. It ignores the details of component imple-
mentation and protocol syntax, in order to provide better performance and
scalability of component interactions [25].
Many applications nowadays are using this type of API style, including
IDSes [26]. This fact makes our VMI system easily extendable to other
security systems, including the built-in policy examiner. We simply accept
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HTTP POST requests in an asynchronous fashion.
Query and Result in JSON
We use Javascript Object Notation (JSON) for queries and results. Its
semistructured schema makes JSON flexible for various types of data, since
it does not have a regular structure [27]. Attributes in a JSON document
are self-described, and hence it is clear for users to understand and easy to
write. It also simplifies the structure of the document, compared to XML.
Thus, using JSON reduces the throughput when transmitting data over the
network.
A simple example of query in JSON from users or other security applica-
tions would be like below.
{
"user": "[token]",
"vm": "[vm_name]",
"command": { ... }
}
The result is similar, but binary data, such as the memory dump, is en-
coded with Base64 [28].
3.2.4 Encryption and Decryption
Since the query itself might disclose the information [29], such as the pid,
we should encrypt both the query and result. We use a generated symmetric
key as the session key to encrypt and decrypt parts of the query and the
result. Moreover, each user has a unique pair of public and private keys.
We use the public key on the user end to encrypt the symmetric key, while
decrypting it with the private key stored in the VMI application end. Each
query session is associated with a unique random symmetric key. Figure 3.2
shows our encryption scheme.
We use this scheme for two reasons. One reason is that public key encryp-
tion, namely the asymmetric key encryption, does not support encryption for
large data by itself [30]. Thus, this scheme allows us to encrypt large data,
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Figure 3.2: Encryption Scheme Used in CryptVMI
such as a 1GB memory dump, and achieve the nearly equivalent security
level as the asymmetric key encryption. CryptDB uses similar approach to
allow for query execution on an encrypted datastore [29]. The other reason is
for performance. RSA is not as performant as symmetric encryption schemes
[30]. Additionally, modern Intel processors have embedded AES symmetric
key encryption hardware accelerators, and applications can benefit greatly
from using AES on these processors [31].
3.2.5 Network Transparency
In our framework, the guest systems is connected to the external network for
their general purposes, such as a SCADA applications connect to external
power grid applications and sensors. However, the remote end running those
applications and sensors should be able to access the SCADA systems running
in guest systems, namely DomUs, and hence the VM inside of this framework
should provide an interface for connections from the outside. Moreover, the
remote end users should not discover that the SCADA system is in a VM
and they should be able to access it as usual. Thus, we need to connect
the two segments of networks together. We use the bridge scheme provided
by the VMM and OS on the host system, which reconfigures its physical
network into a bridged network. Moreover, adopting this approach could
reduce the chance for co-location attacks, which make it possible for attackers
to attack co-located VMs from a compromised VM, once they detect that
the compromised system is in a VM.
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3.3 Policy Examiner at the Remote End
In this section, we describe our design for the policy examiner deployed on
the remote end. In Figure 3.1, we show that both the policy examiner and
other applications and sensors for general purposes are on the same node.
However, in the real world, they do not necessarily have to be on the same
machine.
3.3.1 Architecture
The design of the Policy Examiner has two major components. Figure 3.3
shows the overview of this system.
Figure 3.3: The Architecture of the Remote End
The first component is the monitor. It calls the client application to exam-
ine states of DomUs and keeps monitoring the VM with policies defined in the
database in a certain time period. It also records critical events into database
when a violation is detected. The second component is the database, which
stores policies and records the critical events.
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3.3.2 Policy-Based Monitoring
We use VMI techniques to discover the complete state of a VM, since the
genuine and trustworthy data extracted from a VM with VMI is able to
reflect the state of a VM faithfully. Also, the integrity of the host systems,
namely the Dom0s, are protected by TPM. The process and module lists
are two major facts acquired to analyze the critical systems with our policy
examiner, as they are useful to detect hidden processes and modules, which
might be malicious and cannot be detected by introspection from the inside
of a VM.
Processes are one of the most important part in a critical system, such as
SCADA applications in SCADA systems as they monitor the data coming
from the power grid. In order to verify the integrity of such applications,
we focus on their code segments. The code segment of a process is one of
its sections in memory that contains executable instructions. Its size is fixed
and it is usually read-only within the scope of the guest system, though we
are able to modify it from the host system. Thus, a significant characteristic
of an infected program is the change of its code segment. Based on this fact,
we can verify the integrity of a process by comparing the hash value of the
memory dump of its code segment with the one dumped in a clean state.
The dump of the process from a clean state could be handled from a clean
image template, or other systems running with the same OS or applications
that are guaranteed to be secure. If we detect that the hash value is different
from what we have on file for a process, we can restore the process to its
clean state by sending encrypted commands and clean dumps to the cloud.
The VMI application is then able to overwrite the code segment with our
clean dump.
We enforce our security policies in a white list fashion. Users are able to
define their own policies for entities like processes and modules, and keep
them in the database on the host system. The policy model for each tuple
in the table consists of attributes like module and process names, permitted
users and running time intervals, hash values of the code segments and paths
to their binary dumps processed in a clean state of the VM. The policy
examiner monitors VMs with defined policies in a pre-set time period. Any
violations, such as process names appearing in the process list but not in the
white list, will be reported and recored. Moreover, the tampered process will
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be detected by the hash value of its code segment. In addition, since we want
to obtain consistent snapshots from a VM, we pause the VM while gathering
its process and module list. However, since the code segment is read-only to
the guest system, dumping code segments does not necessarily need a pause.
3.3.3 Evidence Gathering
In order to reproduce the problems of the system, or any attacks, we record
the critical events with a time stamp into the database upon any violations.
We take a sample of the unexpected modification before restoring it to its
original safe state. For instance, we would dump the code segment of the
infected process and store it, before we restore the process to its clean state.
We only keep the path as part of the record tuple in the database, which
leads us to the infected dump in the quarantine.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
4.1 Simulation to the Public Cloud
Systems were set up with a 64-bit CentOS Linux for reliability and simplicity,
since it is an actively maintained Linux variant and its code base is relatively
small. Hash values of processes from the guest systems, were calculated in a
clean VM state with MD5 algorithm. They are stored in a MySQL database
on the remote end.
We set up our experiments with OpenStack to simulate a public cloud
environment. We want to simulate a public cloud in real life, such as Amazon
Web Services (AWS), which uses Xen hypervisor and runs VMs in the para-
virtualization mode [3]. However, the VMs in our cloud system for tenants
were running with full-virtualization enabled with the Xen hypervisor in
order to support unmodified OSes, such as different types of SCADA systems
running on various OSes.
4.2 Cloud API
OpenStack is a popular solution for hosting private clouds developed by
Rackspace and NASA [32]. It has various components addressing necessities
of a cloud system. We deployed the components needed by the controller node
and network node on the same machine, and made it our management node.
Even though the compute node can be the same machine as the management
node, in order to simulate a public cloud environment, we used a separate
machine with the same hardware configuration as our controller node. If
there are multiple compute nodes in this cloud system, each of them should
have its own running copy of the introspection application.
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The OpenStack APIs are also designed in a RESTful manner, and hence
our CryptVMI applications can communicate with them easily using industry
standard libraries.
4.3 CryptVMI
We implemented the three major CryptVMI components in Ruby for three
reasons. The first reason is its natural affinity with JSON documents, because
the dictionary data structure in Ruby can be easily converted into JSON with
the Ruby gem json. The second reason is that it provides gems, namely the
libraries for Ruby, to help us for faster development. We used Ruby Encrypt
in our symmetric key encryption, which simplified the process and hence we
could only keep a 32-byte random string as the key for the AES-CBC-256-
bit encryption [33]. The third reason is that Ruby is an actively maintained
language, therefore security issues can be fixed in time.
4.4 Virtual Machine Monitor
We used the Xen hypervisor to simulate AWS [3]. It has been usually con-
sidered that Xen is not as secure as KVM [34]. KVM can be less dependent
than Xen, because it is essentially a kernel module [22], while Xen needs to
modify the OS kernel [21]. However, Xen is a better choice in our frame-
work. As it is mentioned in previous chapter and Figure 4.1, the security
for Xen virtualization mainly depends on the bare metal hypervisor instead
of Dom0. Dom0 functions similarly to the host system in KVM, but it is
a para-virtualized VM on Xen hypervisor. In KVM, the host system is the
Linux system and it is obvious that the Linux OS is implemented with much
more lines of code than Xen hypervisor, which might lead to more uncertain-
ties. Furthermore, the VMI library that we utilized requires a patch to KVM
[19], and hence it will make the VMM possibly unreliable, which is what we
want to avoid.
Therefore, we still chose to use Xen as our VMM.
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Figure 4.1: Virtual Machine Introspection in Xen and KVM
4.5 Virtual Machine Introspection Library
We built our VMI application on top of LibVMI, which inherits features
from XenAccess. XenAccess is designed based on the concepts of virtual
memory introspection and virtual disk monitoring. Consequently, its APIs
allow applications built on top of it to access the memory and disk of a
specific virtual system [35]. It does not require any modification to the
Xen hypervisor, and hence it has small performance and reliability impact.
LibVMI also provides functions for accessing CPU registers, pausing a VM
and printing binary data [19].
Maitland introduces a lightweight VMI system designed specifically to de-
tect malware through packer detection [36]. The system achieves good per-
formance, but it does not allow user to customize their queries. Furthermore,
it is limited to para-virtualization environments.
By building CryptVMI on top of LibVMI, we can have supports for both
fully and para-virtualized environments, and we are able to write introspec-
tion tools for different payloads.
4.6 Virtual Machine Introspection Use Cases
In order to obtain meaningful data from a VM, it is essential to know the
offsets for processes in task_struct. In order to obtain these offsets, we
need to create a kernel module in a VM with a clean state, which should
not be malicious and is usually the initial state of an image template. This
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is because each version and variant of OSes has various memory offsets [37].
The code below illustrates how to obtain these offsets for VMI applications,
such as those for pid, mm and mm_struct.
struct task_struct *p = current;
pid_offset = (unsigned long)(&(p->pid))
- (unsigned long)(p);
mm_offset = (unsigned long)(&(p->mm))
- (unsigned long)(p);
codeseg_start_offset = (unsigned long)(&(p->mm->start_code))
- (unsigned long)(p->mm);
codeseg_end_offset = (unsigned long)(&(p->mm->end_code))
- (unsigned long)(p->mm);
A two-layer translation to the target address inside of mm_struct could be
processed, with required offsets obtained. Once the process with the desig-
nated pid is found in the iteration of the process list, the VMI application
could obtain the address of mm_struct in its task_struct. The code below
shows then the VMI application is able to access the mm_struct to acquire
the target’s virtual memory addresses, which could be, but not limited to, the
starting and ending addresses of the code segment for a process. In addition,
we can then calculate the size of the code segment using the two addresses,
which is essentially 1+|diffcodeseg|, where diffcodeseg is the difference between
the two addresses.
vmi_read_32_va(*vmi, next_process + mm_offset - tasks_offset,
0, (uint32_t*) &mm_addr);
vmi_read_32_va(*vmi, mm_addr + target_offset,
0, (uint32_t*) &result_addr);
As it is shown in the code below, the VMI application uses the virtual
addresses to read the segments and then write them to files. This uses
the LibVMI’s built-in translation from the virtual memory address to the
physical address.
vmi_pause_vm(*vmi);
vmi_read_va(*vmi, start_codeseg_vaddr,
pid, buffer, code_size);
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fwrite(buffer, 1, code_size, code_file);
vmi_resume_vm(*vmi);
The code below shows how we are able to restore the code segment from
a clean dump.
addr_t curr_vaddr = startcode_vaddr;
while (!feof(original_code)) {
fread(file_buffer, 1, 1, original_code);
vmi_read_8_va (*vmi,
curr_vaddr, pid, mem_buffer);
if(*file_buffer != *mem_buffer) {
vmi_write_8_va(*vmi, curr_vaddr,
pid, file_buffer);
}
curr_vaddr ++;
}
Even though the code segment field is read-only, a process might be ter-
minated during the dumping process. In order to acquire consistent memory
reading, the guest system is paused during the memory access.
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CHAPTER 5
EVALUATION
In our experiments, the user’s client machine, the management node and the
compute node have the same hardware configuration with an Intel Core i7
CPU at 3.40 GHz. The DomU in this experiment, namely the guest system,
is allocated with 1 vCPU and 1GB memory. The same sets of experiments
were conducted 10 times, so the time measurements below are averages.
Figure 5.1: Time Distribution to Extract the Processes List from a VM
Since we want to ignore the time consumed during the network transmis-
sion of data, we benchmarked the code used in CryptVMI for the encryption
and decryption of data. Thus, the total time was the estimated time for
CryptVMI to finish the VMI task without considering network transmis-
sions, while the original time was the time consumed in finishing traditional
VMI tasks. Figure 5.1 shows the results of the average time by running VMI
acquisition for the processes list from a DomU. The overhead introduced is
very little and barely noticed.
Figure 5.2 shows the time spent in dumping and hashing the code segments
of the 1.4KB experiment process, compared to the time for dumping code
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Figure 5.2: Time Distribution to Dump and Hash Code Segments
segments from all 61 processes inside of the VM. The total time is the sum
of the time spent in dumping and hashing processes. We can see that the
two values are very close. The reason could be two-fold. One is that our
VMI application essentially iterates the complete process list it is instructed
to dump only one process. The other is that the loading time of the VMI
libraries might take a large part of the time spent. Thus, we should be able
to improve our results by caching the starting and ending addresses of code
segments in a hash map, instead of iterating the primitive Linux task_struct
list, namely the process list. However, this works only if processes in the VM
do not change often. Furthermore, if we look at the time spent in calculating
hash values, respectively, they are also similar. This is because the loading
time of the Ruby libraries plays a major role. Though it might take around
0.16s to dump the code segment of a process, since the VMM does not pause
the VM, it should not cause any starvation of tasks from the VMM and the
remote end.
Figure 5.3 shows the time spent in restoring the experiment process. It
involves two steps, hashing to determine if there is a need to restore and
writing from the host system to the process. Thus, the total restoration time
spent includes the time spent in both hashing and restoring the code segment
from the host system disk back to the guest virtual instance. As it can be
observed, the time is equivalent to dumping the code segment. We think
that the I/O operation takes a significant portion of it, but it is still very
performant as they can be done in around 0.18s.
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Figure 5.3: Time Spent in Restoration
In Figure 5.4, we can see the results of dumping the whole 1GB mem-
ory from a DomU. The encryption and decryption roughly took the same
time as dumping the memory, which was about 10 seconds. We label the
total time for dumping the 1GB memory as the CryptVMI processing time
in Figure 5.5. In this way, we can compare the CryptVMI dumping with
encryption time with the time consumed in transferring the dumped data in
the cloud system and between the remote client and the management node,
respectively. The results show that the CryptVMI processing time is only a
small portion, compared with the time consumed during transmitting data
through networks.
Figure 5.4: Time Distribution to Dump 1GB memory from a VM
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Figure 5.5: Time Consumed in Data Transmission in Networks and in
CryptVMI
Though the overhead is not much in total, the main reason for this overhead
can be concluded as the slow I/O operations on the disk. Our introspection
application calls the VMI tools to dump the memory. The dump is written
into a file by the VMI tools and then we read the file into memory for Base64
encoding and encryption. Once the data is sent to the user client application,
the user client decrypts it and saves the encrypted dump into a temporary
file. The client then decodes it for users and other applications.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work is based on the author’s past published papers [38, 39, 40]. In
this thesis, we show our design and implementation of CryptVMI, a secure
framework based on Virtual Machine Introspection, to provide flexibility in
its interface to cooperate with other security monitoring systems while keep-
ing the confidentiality of users’ data, especially in the public cloud. It is
able to provide trusted information regarding the complete states of systems,
while keeping network transparency to the connections from the outside. The
policy examiner monitors the critical systems with user defined policies, and
gathers evidence upon violations. Our benchmarks show that CryptVMI
only introduces little overhead in performance. We believe that this solution
is able to address the concerns of the multi-tenancy public cloud, while also
providing an interface for enhanced security.
In the future, we plan to integrate this encryption feature into LibVMI
by modifying the library, instead of relying on application level encryption
schemes. This approach should also increase the performance of our system
as dumps would be then encoded and encrypted in the memory. Eventually,
we want to integrate with more security monitoring systems, such as IDSes,
through our flexible RESTful APIs.
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